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DEVOLUTION AND POST-BREXIT TRADE AGREEMENTS: TOWARDS A JOINT 
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In October 2017 when presenting the Policy Paper, Preparing for our Future UK Trade Policy, 
the Secretary of State for International Trade, Dr Liam Fox, recognised that for the first time 
since the 1970s, the United Kingdom (UK) would have its own independent trade policy.1 
Since the last time the UK had an independent trade policy, there have been notable 
constitutional changes within the UK, notably the creation of devolved administrations in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. All parts of the UK will be differently affected by the 
decision to leave the European Union (EU) (i.e. Brexit) after 29 March 2019, particularly by 
the creation of an independent trade policy. As a member of the EU customs union and of the 
single market, the UK does not at present have an independent trade policy. Instead, trade 
policy is Òlargely determined by the EUÓ2, a position that will change upon the UKÕs departure 
from the EU. While trade is a reserved matter, areas of devolved competence such as 
agriculture will need to be taken account of in any future UK trade policy. The devolved 
administrations will require to be involved in what Dr Fox identified as Òa once in a lifetime 
opportunity to build a stronger, fairer and more prosperous United Kingdom that is more open 
and outward-looking than ever before.Ó3 Indeed, the Policy Paper mentioned above further 
recognised that, Ò(t)he devolved administrations will have a direct interest in our future trade 
agreements,Ó4 with this recognition accompanied by a commitment, Òto seek the input of the 
devolved administrations to ensure they influence the UKÕs future trade policy, recognising the 
role they will have in developing and delivering it.Ó5  
In this present paper, we critically review the UK governmentÕs current approach to involving 
the devolved administrations in post-Brexit trade policy development. We demonstrate that 
there is a significant lack of clarity on the future role of the devolved administrations in the 
development of trade policy. The Scottish government is particularly concerned in this respect 
given that its extensive devolution settlement includes areas with significant trade dimensions 
such as agriculture, fisheries and environmental policy. We argue that greater clarity on such 
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1 Department of International Trade, ÒPreparing for our UK Trade PolicyÓ (2017) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/654714/Preparing_for_our_futur
e_UK_trade_policy_Report_Web_Accessible.pdf, 4.  
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4 Ibid, 22. 
5 Ibid. 
involvement is very much needed and in response, propose the creation of a Trade Policy 
Committee through an amendment to the Trade Bill.  
 
II.! TRADE AND DEVOLUTION 
 
The Trade Bill introduced into the House of Commons in November 2017 is designed to ensure 
that the UK has the necessary powers to conduct an independent trade policy on its departure 
from the EU. In addition to the creation of a Trade Remedies Authority and providing for 
regulations to be made to provide UK implementation of the World Trade OrganisationÕs 
Government Procurement Agreement, it also allows regulations to be made to ensure the 
continuity of existing trade agreements to which the UK is a party by virtue of its membership 
of the EU.6  It is important to note what the Trade Bill does not cover; the customs/tax-related 
elements of a future UK trade policy are to be found in the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 
2018, which received Royal Assent on 13 September 2018) and it does not provide for the 
implementation of new trade agreements.  
 
The approach to be taken to new trade agreements was set out by the Secretary of State for 
International Trade in a statement to the House of Commons on 16 July 2018, which promised 
that Parliament, the devolved administrations, local government and civil society would be 
engaged with to ensure that future trade policy worked for all parts of the UK.7 It was made 
clear that the devolved administrations would be Òable to inform the GovernmentÕs approach 
to negotiations throughout the consultation period and, of course, with subsequent engagement 
throughout the entire negotiation process.Ó8 In response to questions from Members of 
Parliament from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State reiterated that 
trade was a reserved matter, noting in response to one question that Òwe could not go into 
negotiations with someone sitting on the British side of the table who took a different view 
from the GovernmentÕs broader objective for the whole of the United Kingdom.Ó9 As a reserved 
matter, Parliament would be kept updated on the progress of negotiations with primary 
legislation being laid before Parliament to ratify each trade agreement if it requires changes to 
existing legislation or where there are no existing powers, in accordance with the 2010 
Constitutional Reform and Governance Act (CRAGA). No role is assigned to the devolved 
administrations under sections 20 to 25 of CRAGA and it is possible that such agreements 
could impact on the competences of the devolved administrations.10 
 
The above situation stands in marked contrast to the position under the Trade Bill, clause 211 
of which assigns secondary law-making powers to implement international trade agreements, 
in respect of which the UK is already a party due to its membership of the EU, to both UK 
ministers and the devolved administrations. In some circumstances those powers may be jointly 
exercised and in other cases, the devolved administration requires either the consent of, or 
consultation with, the UK minister before exercising these powers. As the Bill modifies the 
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scope of devolved powers, legislative consent is needed from the devolved administrations.12 
The Scottish Government has expressed particular concerns regarding the devolution aspects 
of the Trade Bill, setting out that: 13  
 
The Scottish Government has been very clear about the serious implications for the 
Sewel Convention (and the future of devolution) of the recent actions of the UK 
Government. In particular, we have made it clear that urgent discussions are required 
on how to protect the Convention before any further legislative consent motions on 
Westminster Bills É including the Trade Bill, can be brought forward to the Scottish 
Parliament. 
At present, the Trade Bill is currently at the House of Lords and it is unclear when the Bill will 
move to Report stage due to the acceptance by the Lords of a motion put forward by Baroness 
Smith of Basildon that: 14 
 
(t)he committeeÕs report be not received until Her MajestyÕs Government has presented 
to both Houses proposals for a process for making international trade agreements once 
the United Kingdom is in a position to do so independently of the European Union, 
including roles for Parliament and the devolved legislatures and administrations in 
relation to both a negotiating mandate and a final agreement. 
 
One of the issues here is the role of the devolved administrations in the negotiation of 
international agreements and in this area the Report on the Trade Bill by the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution recommended that:15 
 
É the Government state whether the existing arrangements of the Joint Ministerial 
Committee (Europe) for involving the devolved administrations in the negotiation of 
agreements with the EU will be replicated for trade agreements under the Bill. The 
Government should also set out how intergovernmental mechanisms will be adjusted 
to involve the devolved administrations in international relations and treaty-making 
after Brexit. 
 
The Joint Ministerial Council (JMC) referred to above arises from a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between the UK government and the devolved administrations, first 
agreed in 2001, to promote the principles of good communication, consultation and 
cooperation.16 There are also a number of JMC sub-committees that meet to consider specific 
issues, for example, JMC(E) which focusses on relations with the EU and JMC(EN) on the 
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negotiations for exiting the EU. The interests of devolved administrations in international 
relations is set out in a separate concordat which is supplementary to the MOU.  
 
III.! A TRADE POLICY COMMITTEE 
 
In preparation for the UKÕs departure from the EU in October 2017, the JMC (E) agreed that 
common approaches Ð to be known as Common Frameworks Ð would be developed in some 
areas currently governed by EU law but which would fall with the competence of the devolved 
administrations.17 These frameworks, which depending on the policy area, would consist of 
common goals, minimum or maximum standards, harmonisation, limits on action, or mutual 
recognition, would be established in areas considered necessary to, inter alia, Òenable the 
functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy divergence; ensure 
compliance with international obligations; [and] ensure the UK can negotiate, enter into and 
implement new trade agreements and international treaties.Ó It was noted that the frameworks 
will lead to a significant increase in decision-making powers for the devolved administrations. 
According to the UK Government, legislative common frameworks would be needed in 
twenty-four policy areas the majority of which fall within the areas of agriculture, food, 
fisheries and the environment.18 The latest Government report indicates that the frameworks 
outlines are still being developed with the approach being either primary and/or secondary 
legislation complemented by a memorandum of understanding.19 
 
In the absence of common frameworks which address issues surrounding international 
relations, and especially trade, the UK government and the devolved administrations may fall 
back on the Concordat on International Relations. This confirms the reserved power of the UK 
Government in international relations and promises consultation with the devolved 
administrations on the formulation of the UKÕs position for international negotiations in areas 
that fall within devolved competences.20 However, it is also made clear that in such 
international negotiations, it may be appropriate for Ministers or officials from the devolved 
administrations to form part of a UK negotiating team advancing a single negotiating line 
which the Ministers (or officials) have played a part in developing.21 The Concordat confirms 
that the devolved administrations are responsible for observing and implementing international 
obligations which relate to devolved matters,22 and it recognises that Ò[T]he UK Government 
will, under normal circumstances, not ask the UK Parliament to legislate in any area for which 
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legislative competence has been devolved except with the agreement of the devolved 
legislature.Ó23  
 
However, it should also be noted that each country-specific concordat makes it clear that it is 
Ònot intended to constitute a legally enforceable contract or to create any rights or obligations 
that are legally enforceableÓ and that the relevant legislation devolving power takes 
precedence.24 This legislation gives the UK Government the power to ensure that the devolved 
administrations take action to give effect to international obligations and also do not take 
actions which would be incompatible with these obligations. For example, under section 35 of 
the Scotland Act, the Secretary of State may make an order prohibiting the Presiding Officer 
from submitting a Bill of the Scottish Parliament for Royal Assent if s/he has reasonable 
grounds to believe that it contains provisions which would be incompatible with any 
international obligations of the UK.25 Likewise, section 58 of the Scotland Act 1998 gives the 
UK Government the power to order that a proposed action by the Scottish Parliament should 
not be taken if it would be incompatible with any international obligation of the UK or direct 
that action be taken to give effect to any such obligation.26 It is also possible for the UK 
Government to revoke any devolved legislation if it contains provisions which would be 
incompatible with any international obligations. 
Such legislation, particularly within the context of the future development of trade policy, could 
possibly create constitutional tensions within the UK and a means must be found to eliminate 
such a possibility. In this regard, the Scottish Government has proposed the establishment of 
a, Ònew statutory intergovernmental international trade committee.Ó27 A possible model to 
utilise in this regard would be the experience of the EU in the trade policy area. Article 207(3) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) provides for a Trade Policy Committee 
(TPC) to assist and advise the Commission in negotiating agreements with third countries or 
in international organisations (for example, the World Trade Organisation) that fall within the 
scope of the Common Commercial Policy and is one of the preparatory bodies assisting the 
Council in making decisions in this area.28 One such decision is the authorisation granted on a 
Commission request, for example, to negotiate a new trade agreement with a trade partner; this 
authorisation establishes what the Commission should achieve in the agreement. Article 207(3) 
also requires the Commission to report regularly to the TPC and to the European Parliament 
on the progress of negotiations; this is one area in which an enhanced role has been given to 
the European Parliament. Although the European Parliament does not have the same status as 
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previously known as the Article 133 Committee. See for example, Leal-Arcas, R The EC in the WTO: The three-
level game of decision-making. What multilateralism can learn from regionalism European Integration online 
Papers (EIoP) Vol. 8 (2004) N¡ 14, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-014a.htm.  
the TPC, it is given an enhanced role in the adoption of measures under the Common 
Commercial Policy.  
 
Within this framework as adapted to the UK, the UK Government would be treated as if it were 
the Commission; being both the initiator of negotiating proposals and the body conducting the 
negotiations. The devolved administrations would be treated as if they were the Member States, 
thereby being consulted on the development of the negotiating guidelines for an international 
agreement. They would also be regularly informed of the progress of negotiations and in 
matters falling within the competence of the devolved administrations, would be part of the 
negotiating team. Once concluded, the agreement would have to be ratified, through the 
affirmative procedure, by both the UK Parliament and by the devolved legislatures.29 Again, 
borrowing from EU law, the UK Government and the devolved administrations would be under 
a legal duty to cooperate on the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of agreements 
falling within areas of the competence of the devolved nations.30 Adoption of this framework 
would be effected through an amendment to the Trade Bill, thus giving it legislative force. The 
TPC could apply to ongoing negotiations in respect of the Ôroll overÕ of existing international 
trade agreements where significant changes are envisaged, new trade negotiations and also 





It is clear that the UK governmentÕs current approach to involving the devolved nations in post-
Brexit trade policy development lacks clarity. This has prompted the House of Lords to agree 
to a motion during the Committee stage of the Trade Bill which requires the UK Government 
to set out the role of Parliament and the devolved legislatures and administrations in respect of 
the negotiation and final agreement to international trade agreements. Partly in response to this, 
we proposed the creation of a UK Trade Policy Committee through an amendment to the Trade 
Bill. Modelled on an existing mechanism under EU law, the creation of a UK TPC could help 
address at least some of the tensions surrounding the role of the devolved nations in trade policy 
development post-Brexit.  
 
                                                             
29 Implementation of this aspect of the proposal would require amendment of the 2010 Constitutional Reform and 
Governance Act. 
30 See Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union. 
